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The global financial crisis has led to extensive regulatory reforms around the 
globe. The bail-in rules introduced in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
are an essential part of the new bank crisis management landscape in Europe. 
The paper seeks to clarify their implications and applicability in three ways. First, 
we provide a concise overview of the issues involved based on recent – mainly 
theoretical – literature. Second, we describe the key features of the European 
resolution framework. Third, we discuss the implications of the bail-in approach 
for crisis management in the Nordic context.
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Financial crises where financial intermediation is disturbed have 
often led to massive ‘bail-outs’ where states have financially sup-
ported the continuation of financial institutions’ operations by 
various means. The obvious motivation of such policy has been to 
avoid the serious implications of financial instability for economic 
activity. However, on many occasions these policies have resulted in 
significant costs to taxpayers while not being able to fully eliminate 
financial disruption.  
Furthermore, bail-outs have been hypothesised to create perverse 
incentives, moral hazard, in the sense that they encourage bank 
owners and wholesale creditors to accept excessive risk-taking by 
bank managements. This problem is particularly significant with 
regard to large and highly connected institutions, which often are 
considered ‘too big to fail’.  Reduction of financial instability in the 
short run may thus increase it in the long run.
As a result, much effort has been put into developing regulation, 
supervision and crisis management policies so as to avoid such 
bail-outs of financial institutions. A key element of this are high-
er requirements of capital. In addition, steps have been taken to 
increase financial institutions’ loss absorption capacity through 
the requirement that banks should issue bail-inable debt, i.e. debt 
which, by the decision of resolution authorities, can be written 
down or converted into equity capital as needed to restore solven-
cy. The idea is that with a large enough loss absorption capacity 
even large, systemically important institutions failing or about to 
fail could be ‘resolved’ without disturbing financial intermediation 
too much. 
A key constraint for the rigorous application of the bail-in policy is 
the fear that it could trigger financial instability.  Expectation of 
losses to bank creditors could raise funding costs and weaken li-
quidity, potentially aggravating the situation by leading to an acute 
liquidity crisis. Credit losses and declining asset prices could in turn 
contribute to cascading defaults across the financial system. 
Bail-in policy is also associated with practical difficulties. Imple-
menting bank resolution in a prompt and efficient manner can be 
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difficult, particularly in the context of multinational banks, where 
resolution requires cooperation of authorities of many jurisdictions. 
Hence, an essential part of a resolution framework is contingency 
planning by resolution authorities and banks.
The new approach to the handling of banking crises making use 
of bail-in is a complex undertaking. This paper seeks to produce 
some clarity to this complexity in three ways. Section 2 provides 
a concise overview of the issues involved based on recent – main-
ly theoretical – literature. Section 3 describes the key features of 
the European resolution framework, which has emerged over the 
past five years. Section 4 discusses the implications of the bail-in 
approach for crisis management in the Nordic context. Section 5, 
finally, summarises our key observations.
2. Economic analysis of bank resolution 
and bail-in 
In this section, we discuss the economic rationale for bank resolu-
tion and bail-in, drawing from the theoretical literature and review 
the early empirical evidence.
The Financial Stability Board (2015, p. 5) states as the main guid-
ing principle that ‘[t]here must be sufficient loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity available to implement an orderly res-
olution that minimises any impact on financial stability, ensures 
the continuity of critical functions, and avoids exposing taxpayers 
(that is, public funds) to loss with a high degree of confidence’.
This principle relates closely to the following questions: What is 
the optimal amount of total loss absorbing capacity (henceforth 
TLAC) that banks should have in their balance sheet? Should TLAC 
consist only of capital requirements or should it include also bail-in-
able debt? The first question has been extensively studied after the 
crisis (see e.g. Aikman et al. 2018 for a review). We focus on the 
second question: how much should bank safety be based on equi-
ty capital that reduces the likelihood of failure and how much on 




The literature follows two lines of thought. The first emphasises 
the choice between bail-outs and bail-ins in dealing with bank fail-
ures (see e.g. Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018 and Berger et al. 2019). The 
key trade-off centers on excessive risk-taking incentives (i.e. moral 
hazard) of banks if bail-outs are to be expected instead of bail-ins. 
Governments may choose bail-outs if externalities of bank failures 
cannot otherwise be contained. Hence, bail-in policy is potentially 
time-inconsistent. Therefore, the challenge is to implement bail-ins 
so that major externalities are avoided. This would establish the 
ex-ante credibility of resolutions and reduce moral hazard. 
The other line of thought emphasises the choice between capital 
requirements and bail-inable debt. As Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) note, 
higher capital ratios reduce likelihood of bank failures and hence 
the probability that bail-outs or bail-ins are required in the first 
place. Nonetheless, the optimal mix of total loss absorbing capaci-
ty might contain both bail-inable debt and equity.
When considering the optimal mix of bank funding, the Modigli-
ani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theorem is an important start-
ing point (see e.g. Admati et al. 2013). It implies that, although an 
institution’s cost of equity is higher than its cost of debt, it does 
not follow that more debt is always preferred over equity. This is 
because the cost of equity and debt adjust to a change in their 
shares: a reduction in the debt-to-equity ratio reduces financial risk 
and thereby the cost of both funding sources. In theory, this offset 
is complete and thus the weighted average cost of capital stays 
unchanged.6 This offset appears to be empirically quite high, also 
in the case of banks (see e.g. references in Aikman et al. 2018 and 
Gimber and Rajan 2019).
Two traditional reasons why a firm’s capital structure does matter 
for the total firm value are (i) tax deductibility of interest payments 
and (ii) bankruptcy costs. The former implies a preference for a 
higher and the latter for a lower debt-to-equity ratio. An optimal 
 
6  The cost of equity is higher than the cost of debt as equity is the residual claim on an 
institution’s assets. When the share of equity in the balance sheet increases, it means that 
the share of the more costly form of financing increases. However, this is offset by the fact 
that, as the financial risk of the institution is reduced as a result of less leverage, the risk 
premium of both equity and debt declines. 
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capital structure would strike a balance between these factors. 
These factors are highly relevant also for banks. 
Banks are, however, special because their bankruptcy costs entail a 
high social component, resulting from disruption in financial servic-
es and financial stability (see e.g. Admati et al. 2013). This further 
implies that a bank’s optimal capital structure may differ depend-
ing on whether one takes a private or public perspective. If bank 
shareholders do not internalise the social costs of bank failure, they 
may prefer a higher debt-to-equity ratio and hence tolerate a high-
er probability of bank failure than is socially optimal. This is an im-
portant argument for regulatory capital requirements.
As pointed out by Admati et al. (2013), losing part of the ‘tax 
subsidy’ of debt if capital requirements are increased – i.e., there 
will be less debt and hence less interest payments to deduct 
from earnings before tax on profits is determined – is a private 
cost to bank owners but not necessarily a social cost. Nonethe-
less, the private cost of equity arising from this tax channel (or 
other channels such as high informational cost of issuing new 
equity) may provide banks with incentives to shift part of their 
assets outside their balance sheet to ‘shadow banks’. As a re-
sult, large risks may shift outside the regulatory perimeter with 
financial stability implications. Moreover, higher capital require-
ments, and hence higher private costs of bank equity, may lead 
to a reduction in bank lending and hence slow down economic 
activity.7 This is a factor in determining the socially optimal capi-
tal structure for banks, and has been an active area of research.8 
2.1 Benefits and costs of bail-in
The private costs of bank equity and their potential real implica-
tions are important reasons why many authors have advocated 
hybrid instruments such as contingent capital (‘CoCos’) or, indeed, 
 
7 However, e.g. Dagher et al. (2016) suggest that the economic costs of higher capital 
requirements in the long run are small. 
8 Another important factor that tilts banks’ optimal capital structure towards less equity 
is that banks’ demand deposits, which are part of their debt, provide important liquidity 




bail-inable debt instead of higher equity requirements (see Flan-
nery 2017). Here we focus on bail-in instruments.9
Bail-ins aim to reduce banks’ excessive risk-taking behaviour, as 
mentioned previously.10 In contrast, bail-outs undermine market 
discipline and enable banks to transfer losses to taxpayers, thereby 
encouraging risk-taking.
Moreover, orderly resolution by applying the bail-in tool aims to re-
duce ‘bankruptcy costs’ by offering a swift alternative to laborious 
bankruptcy proceedings and thereby supporting critical functions 
and maintaining financial stability. 
In their analysis of the choice between bail-in, bail-out and no pub-
lic intervention, Berger et al. (2019) assume that all banks and mar-
ket participants know which regime the regulator is committed to. 
In this setting, the authors conclude that the challenges to credibil-
ity of bail-in arise from two sources: the need to avoid contagion 
of problems of one institution to other institutions and the need to 
act fast. The latter issue concerns implementation of bail-in, which 
is tackled by contingency planning by resolution authorities and 
banks alike (see Section 3). 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) develop a banking model with both bail-
out and bail-in costs to analyse the trade-offs in bank resolution. 
By arguing that recent regulatory reforms have likely reduced the 
spill-over costs from bail-ins, they conclude that bail-outs should be 
the exception, not the rule, in the current framework. However, they 
also note that the use of some public funds may need to be allowed 
during systemic crises.
An interesting analysis is provided by Mendicino et al. (2017) who 
simultaneously model the choice of the level of total loss absorb-
ing capacity as well as its composition in terms of bank equity and 
9 Both CoCos and bail-inable debt convert to equity or absorb losses when certain condi-
tions are met; either a trigger equity level is breached from above (CoCos) or a bank failure 
triggers resolution authorities’ intervention and hence bail-in. CoCos recapitalize the bank 
before failure whereas bail-inable debt is activated after the failure has happened (see also 
Chen et al. 2013). 
10 Note that, as pointed out e.g. by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2019), a higher equity level also reduces 
moral hazard, by making bail-outs less likely and giving bank shareholders more ‘skin in the 
game’.  
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bail-inable debt. In their formulation, bail-inable debt and equity 
provide identical loss absorbing capacity. However, too much total 
loss absorbing capacity can reduce banks’ socially valuable liquidity 
provision via demand deposits. Further, equity and bail-inable debt 
help solve different incentive problems within the bank. This has an 
impact on the optimal composition of total loss absorbing capac-
ity. Given their quantitative estimates, they conclude that the cur-
rent plans for the TLAC size are appropriate and that an important 
part of that should consist of bail-inable debt.
Contagion
As already pointed out, the key concern in a resolution situation is 
the potential contagion to other institutions that might lead to a 
full-scale systemic crisis (see e.g. Beck et al. 2020). Whether the 
risk of contagion can be credibly contained is vital for the credibility 
of resolution. The direct contagion channel stems from potential 
cross-holdings of securities among financial institutions. For in-
stance, if debt to be bailed in is held by other banks, these will incur 
losses which in turn could jeopardise their financial health. For such 
reasons, policy proposals such as Liikanen (2012), while strongly 
supporting the use of bail-in, require that bail-inable debt should 
be held by investors outside the banking sector. 
Using proprietary data of securities cross-holdings by banks, Hüs-
er et al. (2017) conduct a network analysis to simulate the effects 
of bail-in. Although their baseline loss scenario is relatively severe, 
they find only muted direct or indirect contagion effects of bail-in. 
However, as Caballero and Simsek (2013, p. 2549) point out, much 
of the contagion risk may arise from the ‘uncertainty about the fi-
nancial network of cross exposures’ among banks. The effects of 
such uncertainty may be difficult to quantify.
Whether or not any deposits should be bail-inable has also been ac-
tively debated. Currently, as described in Section 3.4, only deposits 
covered by deposit insurance are excluded from bail-in. 
Operational challenges
Admati et al. (2013, p. 5) note that ‘[b]ail-in mechanisms place ex-
traordinary demands on regulators in crisis situations and present 
many implementation issues.’ Further, Berger et al. (2019) note 




the greatest concern, several institutions may become subject to 
financial distress simultaneously, complicating resolution authori-
ties’ task further.
One of the most challenging questions is the resolution of multina-
tional institutions which operate through subsidiaries in a number 
of different countries or jurisdictions which have national or re-
gional regulators. The specific challenge is how the loss absorbing 
capacity can be pooled and shared when some of the subsidiaries 
become subject to resolution and bail-in. From the viewpoint of 
efficient risk diversification, the loss absorbing capacity should be 
available at the group level. However, this may not be the case in 
practice as national regulators may start ring-fencing loss absorb-
ing capacity in a crisis situation. 
One strategy implies that resolution and the related loss absorp-
tion would take place through a single point of entry. An alterna-
tive approach is a multiple-point-of-entry resolution where loss ab-
sorbing capacity is separately pre-specified to each subsidiary, or 
group of entities comprising a natural resolution group, in different 
jurisdictions that the multinational bank operates in. 
Bolton and Oehmke (2018) analyse these alternatives.11 A single-
point-of-entry resolution would be the most efficient alternative 
because it centralises decision-making concerning allocation of loss 
absorbing capital to the bank holding company level. However, this 
may not be possible to commit to if the expected transfers needed 
to absorb losses and recapitalise would be too asymmetrically dis-
tributed across different parts of the banking group. In such cases 
a multiple-point-of-entry resolution strategy may be the more ro-
bust arrangement. Given that possible impediments to resolutions 
are different in case a single-point-of-entry or a multiple-point-of 
entry approach is planned for, the analysis of Bolton and Oehm-
ke (2018) also has implications for operational structures of global 
banks. Specifically, opting for a multiple-point-of-entry approach 
entails at least partial withdrawal from cross-border banking. 
11 Faia and Weder di Mauro (2016) come to the same conclusions, and moreover show that 
costs for holders of bail-inable debt instruments are generally higher if authorities are 
unable to cooperate under single-point-of-entry resolution. 
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2.2 Early evidence of market expectations regarding bail-in
There is increasing evidence of the effects on market expectations 
and bank behaviour of the new bank resolution and bail-in frame-
works both in the US and Europe. Dell’Arricia et al. (2018) and Schäfer 
et al. (2016) study how other banks’ credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads have been affected by bail-in actions in Europe. Bank CDS 
spreads have increased as a reaction to bail-ins in the home coun-
try but also in other countries although to a lesser extent. Moreover, 
Schäfer et al. (2016) find that banks in crisis-stricken countries have 
been more strongly affected than banks in other countries. Accord-
ing to the authors, the likely reason is that the fiscal capacity of the 
country in which the bank is headquartered is an important deter-
minant of bail-out expectations. Overall, Schäfer et al. (2016) find 
that market expectations are more strongly affected by bail-in ac-
tions than by the legal implementation of resolution frameworks.12 
The theoretical model of Berger et al. (2019) referred to above sug-
gests that the likelihood of a bail-out policy would diminish as a 
bail-in framework is implemented. They find empirical evidence of 
positive changes in the US banks’ capital ratios, which is consist-
ent with this prediction. The authors also list a number of other 
studies that indicate that bail-ins strengthen market discipline, but 
may also cause undesirable effects such as increased stock market 
volatility. Gimber and Rajan (2019) study how the relative pricing 
of different layers of debt and equity in bank balance sheets are 
affected by the post-2014 reforms in Europe but do not find very 
strong effects.13 Lewrick et al. (2019), on the other hand, find a risk 
premium between bail-inable senior bonds and senior bonds not 
subject to bail-in risk. The risk premium is higher for riskier banks 
and for banks in Europe in comparison to banks in other jurisdic-
tions.
Assessments done by the credit rating agencies further inform us 
about whether the resolution framework is seen as credible. Aik-
man et al. (2018) report that, while the major UK banks’ bondhold-
12 Note that in general it may be difficult to identify whether the impact of bail-ins in one 
country on bank spreads in another results from contagion effects or shifts in beliefs re-
garding future bail-in likelihood. 
13 There is also interesting work in progress using structural Merton-style models to estimate 
market-implied bail-out and bail-in probabilities for banks by Guennewig and Pennacchi 
(2019) and Berndt et al. (2018). The latter estimate that there has been a significant decline 




ers enjoyed around four notches of implied ratings uplift owing to 
expectations of government support in 2010, the uplift had fallen 
to less than one notch by 2016. Blix Grimaldi et al. (2019) report a 
similar trend in a sample of large Swedish banks.
There is also some evidence of the indirect real effects of bail-in. 
Beck et al. (2018) use bank-firm matched Portuguese data to show 
that banks more exposed to the bail-in of a major Portuguese bank 
that unexpectedly collapsed tightened their credit conditions more 
than other banks, and that this had an impact on investment and 
employment in small and medium-sized enterprises dependent on 
these affected banks.
This sub-section has reviewed what previous research has to tell 
about the optimal mix of capital requirements and bail-in capaci-
ty to secure bank safety and, ultimately, maximise social welfare. 
According to Aikman et al. (2018), the current bank capital require-
ments may have been calibrated at a somewhat lower level than 
would appear optimal on the basis of research literature. But if 
the agreed bail-inable debt requirements (see Financial Stability 
Board 2015) are taken as a substitute to capital requirements, the 
total loss absorbing capacity may be close to the estimates of op-
timal capital requirements in the literature. Aikman et al. (2018) 
further note that whether bail-inable debt truly works as a substi-
tute for capital requirements largely depends on how credible bail-
in would be as an enabler of orderly bank resolution, particularly 
in a systemic crisis. Although historical evidence raises concerns in 
this regard, the new resolution powers granted to authorities may 
provide grounds to be more optimistic in the future (Philippon and 
Salord 2017 and Aikman et al. 2018).
3. The bank resolution framework in Europe
An EU legal framework for bank crises was introduced in 2014. It 
consists of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and 
is complemented by the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation 
(SRMR). The BRRD had to be transposed into national law by each 
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EU member state and each European Economic Area country14, 
while the SRMR is a directly applicable regulation, which centralises 
certain resolution functions in the banking union. Overall, the res-
olution frameworks differ somewhat across the Nordic countries 
according to their membership in the EU and participation in the 
banking union. 
In addition to introducing new tools for bank resolution, the BRRD 
is also aimed at better crisis prevention by providing for enhanced 
early intervention powers to supervisors and requiring banks them-
selves to prepare recovery plans to overcome financial distress. In 
what follows, we focus on the resolution function.
3.1 Institutional setup and decision-making procedures15 
The institutional setup and decision-making procedures play 
a key role in ensuring a speedy management of distressed 
banks. First, each EU member state has to designate a national 
resolution authority. Second, for cross-border banking groups, 
resolution colleges have to be set up with participation by all 
relevant national resolution authorities.16 The European Banking 
Authority (EBA) is an observer ensuring the consistent functioning 
of the colleges across Europe and will take on a mediation role 
in case the participants to the joint decision cannot agree. There 
might be disagreement on measures to be taken; whether the 
preferred resolution strategy is to be implemented or refined; 
or how losses incurred are to be allocated across countries.17 
14 The European Economic Area (EEA) consists of the EU member states and three coun-
tries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway; 
excluding Switzerland). The BRRD was fully and formally implemented into the EEA agree-
ment on 1 January 2020 (https://www.efta.int/eea-lex/32014L0059). 
15 See also Ekholm (2020) in this volume for a discussion of resolution procedures in the 
banking union. 
16 The home resolution authority is the chair of the college and commonly takes the lead 
in the annual resolution planning cycle and in outlining the group resolution scheme at 
the time of resolution. A national resolution authority has a voting right in a joint decision 
regarding a bank in case it has a subsidiary in the particular member state. 
17 On the condition that participation to the resolution scheme would pose a national finan-
cial stability threat, a host resolution authority can opt out and exclude a subsidiary from 




In the banking union, most of the decision-making power has been 
shifted to the Single Resolution Board.18 Together with national 
resolution authorities, it forms the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
In deliberating on a specific bank, the Single Resolution Board 
convenes in an extended executive session (the chair and the four 
full-time board members as well as representatives from the 
Commission and the ECB as observers) with representatives of 
the relevant national resolution authorities. No resolution colleges 
are set up for cross-border banks operating only within the banking 
union. For cross-border banks with activity both within and outside 
the banking union, decisions are made both by the extended 
executive session of the Single Resolution Board and the joint 
decision members of the relevant resolution college. 
Once the Single Resolution Board has adopted a resolution scheme, 
it sends it to the European Commission. The scheme may enter 
into force only if no objection is expressed by the Commission or 
the Council of the European Union within 24 hours. If the Commis-
sion objects to some aspects of the scheme, the Single Resolution 
Board must modify it accordingly, after which it is approved and 
enters into force.19 When the resolution action involves a use of the 
resolution funds or the granting of state aid, the resolution scheme 
is adopted after the Commission has decided positively on the 
compatibility of such aid with the internal market. Eventually, rele-
vant national resolution authorities will take the necessary actions 
to implement the resolution scheme at the national level with the 
Single Resolution Board monitoring the execution of the scheme.
18 The Single Resolution Board is the resolution authority for significant banks and other 
cross-border banking groups in the banking union. The national resolution authorities are re-
sponsible for all banks which are not under the direct remit of the Single Resolution Board. 
However, the Single Resolution Board can decide, or a national resolution authority can re-
quest the Single Resolution Board, to exercise its powers with regard to banks falling within 
a national resolution authority’s remit in cases where it is necessary to ensure a consistent 
application of resolution standards. 
19 The Commission can also propose to the Council that the latter should object to the 
scheme because there is no public interest, or the latter should require a material modifica-
tion to the use of the Single Resolution Fund. If the Council objects to the scheme because 
it is not in the public interest, the bank will be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance 
with the applicable national law. If the Council approves the modification to the use of the 
Single Resolution Fund, the Single Resolution Board modifies the scheme accordingly, after 
which it is approved and enters into force. If the Council rejects the proposal of the Com-
mission, the scheme enters into force in its original form. 
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3.2 Resolution strategy and tools
Resolution authorities can take resolution actions only if three con-
ditions are met. First, there is an assessment that a bank is ‘fail-
ing or likely to fail’ by the supervisory authority. Second, there is no 
reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervi-
sory measures would prevent the failure within a reasonable time 
frame. Third, a resolution action is deemed necessary from a pub-
lic interest point of view (also fulfilling the ‘no-creditor-worse-off’ 
principle which requires that creditors would not have been worse 
off in normal insolvency proceeding). 
If conditions for putting a bank into resolution are met, the resolu-
tion authority decides on the appropriate resolution strategy and on 
the application of resolution tools, of which bail-in is one. The other 
resolution tools are the sale of business, the bridge institution, and 
the asset separation tool.20 When deciding on the appropriate tool, 
resolution authorities have to abide by the least-cost principle and 
avoid destruction of value unless necessary to achieve the resolution 
objectives set out in EU legislation.21
3.3 Annual resolution planning
The resolution authority takes a decision on the resolution plan 
(including an assessment of critical functions, a description of 
the preferred resolution strategy and measures needed to en-
sure financial and operational continuity) and on the minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) an-
nually. The MREL, aiming to ensure sufficient resources that 
can absorb losses and provide for recapitalisation, is one of the 
key tools in enhancing banks’ resolvability and it applies to all 




20 See Single Resolution Board home page (https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/tasks-tools). 
21  The resolution objectives are: (i) to ensure the continuity of critical functions; (ii) to avoid 
significant adverse effects on financial stability; (iii) to protect public funds; (iv) to protect 
depositors; and (v) to protect client funds and client assets. The Single Resolution Board 
approach to public interest assessment was published in July 2019 (https://srb.europa.eu/
en/node/799). 
22  For details on how the MREL requirement is determined, see the Single Resolution Board 
MREL policy (https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/mrel). Global systemically important banks 
must also comply with the international standard for total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC). 




resolution strategy as outlined in the resolution plan. The MREL can 
be met by a bank’s own funds and specific debt instruments.23
 
In the annual resolution planning process, the resolution authorities 
also identify possible impediments to orderly resolution and have 
the mandate to ask the bank to take steps to remove them, includ-
ing setting the MREL and monitoring that banks build up eligible 
liabilities in the agreed time frame.24
3.4 Application of the bail-in tool
When the bail-in tool is applied, debt is written down or converted 
to equity according to a predefined creditor hierarchy (see Table 1). 
The bail-in tool excludes deposits covered by the deposit guaran-
tee scheme. In addition, several other types of instruments are ex-
cluded, including covered bonds and certain other debt instruments 
that are fully secured.25 Retail and small-and-medium-sized firms’ 
deposits in excess of the deposit guarantee scheme limit are pre-
ferred to senior unsecured debt and only touched in case the bail-in 
of securities in the latter class is not sufficient.
Some member states have altered the national insolvency ranking 
to make non-preferred, non-covered deposits, i.e. primarily corpo-
rate deposits, senior to senior unsecured debt.26 The unfortunate 
consequence is that the treatment of deposits is different across 
Europe, with implications for the predictability of loss waterfall in 
case of bail-in, but also for the assessment of possible breach of 
the ‘no-creditor-worse-off’ principle.  
Regulatory steps to protect retail investors from bail-in have been 
taken. In the implementation of the Second Bank Recovery and Res-
23 Common Tier 1 capital, Additional Tier 1 capital, and Tier 2 capital; and debt instruments 
with a remaining maturity of at least one year, not related to derivatives, issued and fully 
paid using funds not financed by the bank itself, not collateralised or guaranteed, and not 
related to preferential deposits. 
24  The Single Resolution Board has outlined its expectations that banks are to meet in order 
to become resolvable (see public consultation: https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/866). 
25 These include client assets, liabilities to unrelated institutions with an original maturity of 
less than seven days, liabilities arising under payment and settlement systems, liabilities to 
employees, liabilities to certain trade creditors, tax and social security claims, and claims of 
deposit guarantee schemes. 
26  For the insolvency ranking in the banking union member states, see the listing published 
by the Single Resolution Board (https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/ldr_-_annex_on_in-
solvency_ranking_2020_v1.1.pdf). 
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olution Directive, the member states are given alternative means of 
restricting retail investors’ investments in bail-inable instruments 
(for example a cap on the proportion of such instruments in the re-
tail investor’s portfolio, and a minimum required initial investment 
amount). To mitigate the risk of contagion across the banking sec-
tor, measures have been taken to disincentivise the most systemi-
cally important banks to hold bail-inable instruments.27
The introduction of the senior non-preferred debt class in the insol-
vency ranking aims to ensure that the extent to which senior un-
secured debt is touched by bail-in is limited, thus helping to avoid 
27 Specifically, the global systemically important banks need to deduct their holdings of 
bail-inable instruments issued by other global systemically important banks from their own 
eligible liabilities. 
Table 1 Order of loss absorption in bail-in
Liabilities legally excluded from bail-in
Common Tier 1 capital Shareholders’ equity and 
retained earnings
Additional Tier 1 capital Preferred shares, 
perpetual term contingent 
convertible securities
Tier 2 capital Hybrid instruments, deeply 
subordinated debt
Senior non-preferred debt Subordinated debt 
instruments senior to tier 2 
capital, but junior to senior 
unsecured debt
Senior unsecured debt Corporate (non-SME) 
deposits, bonds and other 
instruments
Deposits not covered by the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme, but preferential
Retail and SME deposits in 
excess of 100 000 €
Covered deposits
(≤ 100 000 €)
Secured debt 
such as covered 







triggering contagion. Furthermore, improved predictability of the 
treatment of different debt instruments at the time of resolution 
is expected to facilitate pricing and support market discipline. The 
credit rating agencies have amended their rating methodologies to 
account for the new credit hierarchy.
The valuation to determine the extent of the bail-in needed to cov-
er losses and recapitalise the bank is to be done by an independent 
party. Resolution authorities, in close dialogue with the supervisor, 
decide on the level of capital that is necessary following a bail-in. 
The level should not only reflect the minimum capital requirement 
of the institution post the resolution weekend, but also the need to 
ensure market confidence, thus enabling the resolved bank to rely 
on market funding as soon as possible. 
3.5 Funding in resolution28
In addition to the bail-in of creditors, the Single Resolution Fund 
or any of the national resolution funds outside the banking union 
may contribute to the recapitalisation of a failing bank. The reso-
lution fund’s contribution to the recapitalisation of a resolved bank 
is subject to several strict conditions. Losses totalling at least eight 
per cent of total liabilities including own funds must already have 
been covered by the use of the bail-in tool, and the contribution of 
the fund may not exceed five per cent of total liabilities including 
own funds of the institution under resolution.29 The European Sta-
bility Mechanism will act as a backstop to the Single Resolution 
Fund in case it would be depleted.30
 
The capacity of the resolution funds is calibrated with a view to 
cover losses and recapitalise banks in a severe crisis situation, such 
28  See also Ekholm (2020) in this volume for further discussion. 
29  In case the member state has chosen to have a larger ex-ante-funded resolution fund 
amounting to three per cent of covered deposits rather than one per cent thereof, the use 
of the resolution fund is conditioned on covering by the bail-in tool losses of at least 20 per 
cent of risk-weighted assets of the institution concerned rather than the stricter require-
ment of eight per cent of total liabilities. The requirement to apply bail-in before the use of 
the fund does not apply in case the fund is only used as liquidity support in a situation when 
the bail-in tool is not applied. 
30 The common backstop provided by the European Stability Mechanism will be in place at 
the latest by 1 January 2024. The size of the backstop will be aligned with the target level of 
the Single Resolution Fund, thus effectively doubling the estimated 60 billion euros capacity 
of the Single Resolution Fund. If the credit line is used, the Single Resolution Fund will pay 
back the European Stability Mechanism loan with money from bank contributions within 
three years. 
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as a global financial crisis.31 However, the resources of the resolu-
tion funds, including the Single Resolution Fund and the backstop 
provided by the European Stability Mechanism, are not necessarily 
sufficient for the provision of liquidity in resolution, particularly in 
case of very large banks. Even if a bank would be recapitalised, ac-
cess to market funding might be limited for days or weeks. Adding 
to the challenge, collateral enabling participation in normal cen-
tral bank operations is not necessarily available and the provision 
of emergency liquidity assistance32 may be constrained by existing 
rules and regulations. In the banking union, it is commonly under-
stood that the existing arrangements are not entirely fit-for-pur-
pose and a number of potential solutions are being discussed in 
political fora.33
 
In some EU member states, in case of a systemic crisis, resolution 
authorities may also seek funding from so called governmental sta-
bilisation tools.34 However, this is only possible after bailing-in at 
least eight per cent of total liabilities including own funds. Hence, it 
is apparent that there has been a fundamental regime switch from 
bail-out to bail-in with very limited room to use public funds.
4. Bail-in in the Nordic context 
4.1 The Nordic financial system and the institutional set-up 
for resolution
The Nordic financial systems are bank-centred and dominated by 
a few large institutions that are highly interconnected (see Figures 
1  and 2). The strong interconnectedness implies that cross-border 
collaboration is an essential part of bank resolution in the Nordic 
countries. Indeed, resolution colleges have been set up for six Nordic 
banking groups (see Box 1).  The work of the colleges builds on the 
long tradition of supervisory colleges in the Nordic-Baltic region. 
31  See the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive impact assessment and de Groen and 
Gros (2015). 
32 Emergency liquidity assistance refers to exceptional situations in which a central bank 
provides funding to a financial institution facing liquidity problems with operations that are 
not standard monetary policy operations. 
33 For more information, see European Parliament (2019). 
34 This requires that the relevant articles of the BRRD have been transposed to national 





Figure 1 Banking sector size in selected European countries, 2018, percent of 
GDP
Figure 2 Cross-border claims of Nordic banking sectors, third  quarter 2019
Sources: ECB, Finance Norway and Statistics Norway. 
Note: The thickness of the arrows reflects the share of bilateral foreign claims 
in the total claims of the banking sector extending the loans.













Bail-In: EU Rules and Their Applicability 
in the Nordic Context
The resolution planning cycle is well-established in the Nordic coun-
tries as a number of cycles have already been completed by the 
resolution colleges. With the re-domiciliation of Nordea from Swe-
den to Finland, the responsibility for Nordea was transferred from 
the Swedish resolution authority to the Single Resolution Board in 
the autumn of 2018. Given that the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive has now been transposed into national legislation in Nor-
way, the resolution college for DNB has been established and its 
first joint decisions on the resolution plan and the MREL were taken 
at the end of 2019.
Given the systemic importance and centralised business models of 
the large Nordic banking groups, a single-point-of-entry approach 
where bail-in is implemented at the parent level while ensuring the 
continuation of the (healthy parts of the) whole group, is foreseen. 
To ensure sufficient loss absorption capacity, it is assessed that a 
recapitalisation amount roughly equal to the capital requirement 
currently set to cover losses is needed. This effectively doubles (the 
euro amount of) a bank’s loss absorbing capital compared to the 
supervisory capital requirement. While the regulatory capital re-
quirement is set in relation to a bank’s risk-weighted assets35, the 
MREL is set in relation to total liabilities and own funds (see Table 
3). Currently, all the Nordic banking groups fulfil the minimum re-
quirements that have been set.  
While the large Nordic banks are all well capitalised, the MRELs 
exceed the leverage ratio (capital requirement set in relation to 
unweighted assets rather than to the risk exposure amount) sig-
nificantly. The difference between the MREL and leverage ratio re-
quirement tells us what role bail-inable debt plays for a bank’s total 
loss absorption capacity.
To date there is no real-life experience of the use of the bail-in tool 
in the new EU framework. Specifically, senior unsecured debt has 
not been touched in the recent cases of bank distress, either be-
cause other resolution tools than bail-in have been applied or be-
cause the Single Resolution Board did not see that resolution was 
35 Banks must calculate a total risk exposure amount which is the sum of their credit risk, 
operational risk, market risk, and the risk of a credit valuation adjustment. The total risk 




Box 1 The institutional set-up for resolution
In the Nordics, the institutional set-up for the resolution authority varies:
 • Finland (FI): The Financial Stability Authority, which is an independent au-
thority, while administratively under the Ministry of Finance, is responsible 
for both resolution and deposit guarantee scheme.
 • Sweden (SE): The Swedish National Debt Office is responsible for both 
resolution and the deposit guarantee scheme.
 • Denmark (DK): The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority and the state-
owned Financial Stability Company are resolution authorities. The latter 
is responsible for resolution execution, and also for the deposit guarantee 
scheme.
 • Norway (NO): The Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority is responsi-
ble for resolution.
The number of members and observers in the resolution colleges reflect the 
geographic scope of the bank (see Table 2). Whether or not a resolution au-
thority in a host country takes part in the joint decision-making depends on 
whether the bank operates as a branch or a subsidiary there. For countries 
within the banking union, whether the national resolution authority or the SRB 
is the joint decision party depends on whether or not the subsidiary is signifi-
cant enough to be under the direct supervision of the ECB. In case the SRB is 
the party to the joint decision, the national resolution authority participates in 
the college as an observer. 
Table 2 Composition of resolution colleges for the largest Nordic banks










joint decision or as 
observer
Nordea SRB SE, DK FI, NO
Svenska 
Handelsbanken
SE FI, UK DK, NO
SEB SE SRB DE, DK, EE, FI, LI, 
LT, LU, NO, PO
Swedbank SE SRB EE, DK, LI, LT, NO
Danske Bank DK FI, LU, SE, UK EE, LI, NO
DNB NO LU, PO FI, SE, UK
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in the public interest resulting in a normal insolvency proceeding for 
the distressed bank.36 Also there have been cases where funds of 
the deposit guarantee scheme have been used to take preventive 
measures and thus avoiding a situation in which the bank would 
have been deemed failing or likely to fail.
36 For information on recent cases, see the Single Resolution Board home page (https://srb.
europa.eu/en/content/resolution-cases) and Schäfer et al. (2016).
Capital 
requirement 






























19.1* 23.2 4.9 5.8 12.6* 
SEB 18.7* 23.3 5.1 7.3 11.1*
Swedbank 18.9 21.8 5.4 6.5 10.9*
Danske 
Bank
19.4 22.7 4.6 10.8 11.5**





Table 3 Capital requirement and Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities 
(MREL) in the largest Nordic banks, percent
Sources: Information on capital requirements, capital ratio as well as leverage 
ratio is based on the fourth-quarter and full-year 2019 reports of the six banks. 
Information on MREL in force from the beginning of 2020 (30 June 2020 for 
DNB) is based on Nordea Debt Investor Presentation Q4 and full year 2019; 
Swedish National Debt Office, Annual Decisions Taken on Planning for Crisis 
Management of Swedish Banks https://www.riksgalden.se/fi/press-and-
publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2018/annual-decisions-
taken-on-planning-for-crisis-management-of-banks/ 18.12.2019; Danske bank, 
Fastsættelse af krav til nedskrivningsegnede passiver, jf. § 266 i lov om finansiel 
virksomhed, and DNB Debt Investor Presentation February 2020. Information 
on MREL eligible resources of Swedish banks in the third quarter of 2019 has 
been published by the Swedish National Debt Office in Crisis Preparedness of 
Swedish Banks Q3 2019. * Data from the third quarter of 2019 rather than the 
fourth quarter of 2019 as used elsewhere in the table. ** Estimation based on 




There is, however, valuable experience gained from crisis simula-
tion exercises. In January 2019, the Nordic and Baltic financial 
stability authorities and relevant authorities from the European 
Union conducted a joint exercise. This tested the authorities’ cri-
sis management capabilities and regional cooperation in the new 
European framework in a hypothetical crisis scenario involving fic-
titious financial institutions in the Nordic and Baltic countries. The 
findings of the exercise will be used to enhance the practical cri-
sis management preparedness of the authorities involved. Work is 
underway to develop the necessary technical means for efficient 
collaboration and communication. The Nordic and Baltic countries 
have agreed to conduct regular financial crisis simulation exercises 
going forward.
4.2 Bail-in in the Nordic environment: what do we know?
Given the structure of the Nordic banking system, the failure of any 
major bank in the Nordic area can have systemic implications for 
the home country as well as the other Nordic countries. Therefore, 
whether or not the EU bail-in framework works in systemic crises is 
crucial for the Nordics. 
It is, however, very difficult to determine how bail-in would play out 
in a systemic crisis. First, there is no test case of a systemically 
important bank failing or being under an acute risk of failure in Eu-
rope since the enactment of the BRRD. Second, the little evidence 
that exists about bail-ins of systemically important banks prior to 
BRRD and recent bail-ins of non-systemic banks is unlikely to pro-
vide reliable guidance as to what would happen in a bail-in applied 
to a major Nordic bank. 
The resolution of two undoubtedly systemic Cypriot banks in 2013 
is the most extensive bail-in case in Europe in the recent past. The 
disruption of the financial system was significant as was the asso-
ciated economic crisis. GDP declined by 6% in the year of the bail-
in. Nevertheless, by 2019 Cyprus’ GDP is forecast to have grown 
by the same rate of 11 % relative to 2012 as that of the euro area 
as a whole. Thus, there was a major shock to the real economy but 
not one that set Cyprus clearly apart from the neighbouring coun-
tries which did not experience a similar bail-in shock. The impact 
on banks outside Cyprus was also statistically significant in terms 
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of changes in banks’ stock prices and CDS spreads (Schäfer et al. 
2016). But these effects were not long-lasting.
There was an important mitigating factor, though. A large fraction 
of the bail-in losses was borne by foreign (mainly Russian) credi-
tors and stock owners. This limited the impact on the Cyprus econ-
omy. Similarly, its small size and its relatively weak links to other EU 
countries’ banking systems (except for Greece) reduced the impact 
on other countries. 
Other less extensive bail-in events in Europe suggest that other 
banks, their stock prices and CDS spreads, can be affected widely 
by bail-in actions (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018, Schäfer et al. 2016). The 
real economy consequences have not been systematically analysed. 
There are, however, no indications that they have been significant.
The Danish bail-in cases, Amagerbanken in 2011 and Andelsbank-
en in 2015, are of special interest from the Nordic perspective. Im-
portantly, as in Cyprus, in both cases the bail-in extended to senior 
debt. There is evidence of some reactions in the financial markets. 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) report statistically significant changes in 
bank stock prices and CDS spreads, as in other bail-in cases. Also 
the ratings of systemically important financial institutions weak-
ened somewhat following the bail-ins. The effects were neverthe-
less modest.  
The few recent bail-in cases discussed do not point to overwhelming 
consequences. But, as noted, the examples may not be very inform-
ative about contagion effects if bail-ins were to be implemented 
in highly interconnected large banking institutions.  Some insight 
into such effects is provided by Hüser et al. (2017) in the simulation 
analysis referred to in Section 2.  Two key findings emerge in the 
baseline scenario:  (i) there are no bank defaults as a consequence 
of the bail-in of any other bank, and (ii) in all cases subordinated 
debt is affected (in 75% of the cases bail-in is extended to senior 
unsecured debt, but only in one case deposits are hit).
The analysis is obviously partial as it only considers the direct im-
pacts on other large banks through cross-holdings. The direct 
impacts on smaller banks and other holders of debt are not con-




assets and confidence are excluded from the analysis. Therefore, 
while the direct contagion effects appear subdued (the expression 
used by authors), the results should be regarded as a lower bound 
of the contagion effects a shock to the capital of a single bank can 
lead to.
While there are bank failures which stem from truly idiosyncratic 
shocks in the presence of otherwise normal financial market con-
ditions, failures tend to cluster in times of generalised economic 
weakness. The attempts of the individual banks and other financial 
market players to reduce risks and improve their liquidity positions 
may in such circumstances lead to significant reduction of lend-
ing and to fire sales of assets. Such coinciding reactions may com-
pound the initial shocks significantly. 
These worries about the contagion spreading in fragile financial 
market and macroeconomic conditions have led some experienced 
observers to raise doubts about the feasibility of bail-in in situa-
tions of systemic vulnerability. Former US Treasury Secretary Timo-
thy Geithner for example writes: ‘…imposing haircuts on bank cred-
itors during a systemic panic is a sure way to accelerate the panic’ 
(Geithner 2014, p. 214). In the same vein, Goodhart and Avgouleas 
(2014, p. 37) conclude that bail-in could be used for systemically 
important banks only if the problem was idiosyncratic. In other cir-
cumstances, ‘contagion may be uncontainable’. 
Whatever the final assessment of the contagion effects of a bail-
in of a major institution during generalised financial and economic 
weakness may be, such effects can be reduced by good resolution 
planning. First, the planning needs to make sure that the financial 
institutions are in practice resolvable in the very short time typical-
ly available for effective resolution and that the institutions have 
sufficient amounts of bail-inable liabilities. Second, to reduce un-
certainty, the investors and depositors need to be made clear of 
the potential of resolution and how different assets are treated 
in resolution situations. Third, an effective collaboration of the re-
spective authorities is essential for a smooth resolution of institu-
tions operating in several jurisdictions. Fourth, there needs to be 
ample liquidity available for solvent institutions.
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It seems to us that the factors helping to contain spillover ef-
fects are in a relatively good shape in the Nordic area. Banks are 
in general well-capitalised and all significant institutions meet the 
minimum requirement of bail-inable liabilities. The cooperation be-
tween the competent authorities is close; resolution colleges have 
been set up for all significant institutions and resolution based on 
the single-point-of-entry approach is foreseen. The resolution au-
thorities have conducted crisis simulation exercises and continue 
to do so on a regular basis. 
5. Conclusions
The global financial crisis led to regulatory reforms, which have 
enhanced both the resilience of the banking sector and the crisis 
management abilities of authorities. The bail-in rules introduced 
in the EU legislation are an essential part of the bank crisis man-
agement reform in Europe. Instead of bail-outs of bank creditors 
by public authorities, bank creditors along with owners are now 
foreseen to share the burden of bank failures. 
The analyses surveyed suggest that the crisis resolution approach 
based on bail-in could reduce taxpayers’ costs in the short run and 
improve risk-taking incentives in the long run. However, it is not 
equally clear to what extent the loss absorption capacity should 
take the form of equity capital and various hybrid instruments and 
to what extent that of bail-inable liabilities. 
The European resolution framework sets clear rules for the plan-
ning and execution of bank resolution, including bail-in of creditors. 
The institutions foreseen for the implementation of bank resolu-
tion are largely in place. Nevertheless, not all banks in Europe have 
yet modified their liability structures to meet the requirements set 
by the authorities, nor is the supporting legislation, e.g. on national 
insolvency procedures, harmonised as would be useful. The empiri-
cal evidence on the application of the new rules is scanty and does 





The key challenge is contagion when a major – systemically impor-
tant – institution is subject to bail-in, particularly in the circum-
stances of generalised economic weakness. Because of this, it can-
not be excluded that public money will need to be used to safeguard 
financial stability also in future banking crises. However, even if 
some public funds may be deemed necessary, the need for public 
funds will most likely be less than what it has historically been.
The systemic challenge of bail-in is very important in the Nordic 
countries with a concentrated and highly interconnected banking 
system. Fortunately, the resolution planning of authorities as well 
as the banks is well-advanced. This gives some confidence that the 
resolution of even a large Nordic bank should be doable without 
devastating financial stability consequences, at least when the fail-
ure has idiosyncratic roots.
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Comment on E. Jokivuolle, V. Vihriälä, K. Virolainen and  
H. Westman: Bail-In: EU Rules and Their Applicability in the  
Nordic Context 
 
Pär Holmbäck Adelwald1 
The paper provides a number of interesting perspectives on the 
new financial crisis management framework called resolution 
which is now being established throughout all major economies. 
For a practitioner, the literature review in the paper is very helpful 
when contemplating some of the fundamental questions under-
pinning crisis management in general and the new resolution and 
bail-in framework in particular.
Two such questions addressed in the paper concern first whether 
the bail-in of banks’ creditors will lead to substantial contagion, 
especially if applied in a systemic crisis, and second how liquidity 
is to be ensured through a resolution procedure. My opinion is that 
the concerns expressed in relation to contagion are exaggerated, 
whereas the issue of funding in resolution is more serious and war-
rants further discussion.
1. Will bail-in cause contagion?
The introduction of a resolution framework was mandated by G20 
leaders in 2009 following the massive disruption to the financial 
system and world economy caused by first the demise of Lehman 
Brothers and, subsequently, the costly bail-outs of banking groups 
by governments around the globe. Whereas the case of Lehman 
made it clear that systemically important institutions could not be 
allowed to fail in a disorderly way, the bail-outs proved not to be a 
workable strategy because of the substantial damage they caused 
to public finances in places like Ireland and Iceland. There was a 
need for a third way, as the authors put it, between non-interven-
tion and bail-out. That third way is resolution, which in its core is 
1 Swedish National Debt Office. Email: par.holmback@riksgalden.se.
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nothing short of the reinstitution of the fundamental principles of 
the market economy to the banking system.2
While most people seem to agree resolution and bail-in is a good 
idea in principle, some are concerned it might lead to an amplifica-
tion of the problems if applied in a systemic event (see for instance 
Goodhart and Avgouleas 2014, Geithner 2017 and Borg 2019). The 
risk perceived is that, while the bail-in might restore the solvency of 
one firm, it will spread the problems to other firms because of (a) 
cross-holdings and (b) general uncertainty gripping the market. Al-
though due caution should of course be paid when discussing mat-
ters as complex as financial crises, these concerns are exaggerated 
as I see it.
Take cross-holdings: will the bail-in of firm A risk to impose losses 
on firm B at such proportions that B also becomes insolvent? That 
will only happen if B is holding the instruments issued by A that 
will be subject to bail-in. It is true that banks typically hold large 
amounts of one another’s instruments, not least in the Nordics, 
but it is crucial to differentiate between what types of instruments 
they are holding. Mostly, these are covered bonds which are statu-
torily exempt from bail-in. They cannot be bailed in. And further, 
in addition to the capital instruments already in place banks are 
now required to issue large amounts of subordinated debt. That is 
debt instruments which will rank in between capital and senior un-
secured instruments, i.e. the normal funding of a bank which is de-
pendent on wholesale markets or large corporates’ deposits. These 
are the instruments which primarily will be carrying the risk of being 
bailed in, not senior unsecured funding and certainly not covered 
bonds. The risks of direct contagion, therefore, will be very limited.3
To the other cause for concern then: what about general uncertain-
ty when writing down capital and converting debt instruments into 
equity? Will investors not stop funding the bank out of sheer panic, 
as argued by Caballero and Simsek (2013) and cited by the authors? 
This argument draws upon the 2008 experience when the failure 
2 I will be elaborating on this theme in a forthcoming publication.
3 It is striking that Hüser et al. (2017), as cited by the authors, show that even before the 
introduction of the subordinated debt requirements none of the 26 banks included in the 
study would have become insolvent when bail-in is applied. In terms of the issuances of 





and non-intervention in Lehman caught market actors with total 
surprise. No one had expected the US authorities to let a system-
ic institution fail. But when that happened, investors worried who 
might be next and sought to get out of whatever exposures they 
could. This is the crucial point: no one expected this to happen. The 
purpose of resolution, on the other hand, is to achieve a paradigm 
shift whereby the expectations are moved from the paradigm of 
bail-out to the paradigm of bail-in. It is to be made crystal clear 
that debt instruments might face losses after capital instruments 
in accordance with the hierarchy of claims. Also in this regard does 
subordinated debt, therefore, become important. By separating 
this chunk out of the broad senior unsecured step of the insolvency 
ladder, investors will know ex ante what kind of risk they are buy-
ing and thereby be able to price it correctly. Provided that the sub-
ordinated debt layer becomes adequately sizeable, investors will 
then de facto be able to choose whether they want to buy a debt 
instrument which has a contingent capital feature to it or if they 
want to buy a normal funding instrument. There should be no more 
surprises.
This paradigm shift is now in the making. Most institutional inves-
tors in Europe and the US are, according to my experience, nowa-
days quite clear on this route of travel. Standard & Poor’s (2019) 
says that ‘[…] Europe and the U.S. will complete the transition from 
bail-out to bail-in and so, in time, will deliver substantially resolvable 
systemic banks’. Tucker (2013) was of the opinion already five years 
after Lehman that the US had come to the point where resolving 
systemically important institutions was fully possible. What is nec-
essary to complete this transition also in Europe is that politicians 
and policy makers stay firm in their ambition to abolish too–big-to-
fail and not risk ending up in the Irish predicament once more.
2. Liquidity funding in resolution – central banks 
need to move
The second item I want to focus on, and where I think the authors 
could have elaborated further, is the issue of temporary liquidity 
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funding. In this regard there is a need in Europe and the Nordics 
to get clarity around how a bank in resolution might draw on the 
central banks’ liquidity facilities.
A common reaction from the central banking community when 
this issue is raised is that further clarity cannot be provided since 
it would further moral hazard, citing the well-known arguments of 
Thornton and Bagehot on the risks of having a too generous lender 
of last resort.4 However, in the case of lending to a bank which has 
been put into resolution, there is no risk of moral hazard.
Why is that? For the rather simple reason that in most cases re-
solving a bank will entail the application of bail-in, thereby wiping 
out the shareholders and facing subordinated bondholders with a 
loss or conversion of their holdings into equity. And obviously, the 
senior management which steered the bank into failure will be re-
placed and whatever incentive program they enjoyed will not be 
as shiny following the bail-in procedure. So the question then is 
whose moral it is that would be hazarded if the central bank were 
to support a resolution procedure? It is hard to see the case. If any-
thing, resolution will strengthen the central bank’s position before 
the point of failure since it will enable it to actually say no when an 
insolvent bank applies for lender of last resort support as it can be 
put into resolution instead.
Rather, what is happening is that another public body in the shape 
of the resolution authority comes in to manage the failure and re-
store the bank’s viability and reorganize it on behalf of the state. 
Quite another thing than a privately controlled firm which gambles 
for its resurrection.
Even though discussions on this matter have been ongoing for a 
couple of years now, there has not been much movement in terms 
of public statements on how central banks’ facilities might be used 
in resolution. In contrast, The Bank of England, the Reserve Bank 
of Canada and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority are among 
those central banks who have publicly declared being open for busi-
4 Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873) argued, in essence, that central banks should lend to 
banks in trouble only as long as they were solvent, against adequate collateral and at penal 
interest rates. Otherwise, they argued, there was a risk that banks might take excessive 




ness. From a crisis management perspective these are very helpful 
statements.
Elsewhere, such as at the ECB and the IMF, there seems to still be 
a lot of focus on the moral hazard argument. And also closer to 
home, I have to admit. But for the reasons just mentioned, I would 
argue this is flawed thinking.
The issue of how to ensure the temporary funding of a bank in res-
olution is a crucial element in successfully applying the new frame-
work. Resolution authorities will need some time for the dust to 
settle from the resolution weekend when they take control and 
communicate what is to happen. It may be that the bank’s own 
liquidity resources and collateral pools are exhausted and that reg-
ular counterparties are not inclined to resume lending immediately. 
Extending a guarantee or bilateral loan from the resolution funds 
may be an option, but it might take some time for it to be opera-
tional. That creates a gap which someone has to fill and that some-
one should be the central bank.
So, I would concur with Tucker (2018) in his recommendation to 
central banks that they should reconsider their polices in this re-
gard and, as he put it, start ‘shouting from the rooftops’ what the 
conditions for access to resolution facilities would be.
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Comment on E. Jokivuolle, V. Vihriälä, K. Virolainen and 
H. Westman: Bail-In: EU Rules and Their Applicability in the  
Nordic Context 
Kim Ristolainen1 
The authors succeed in a demanding task of clarifying the econom-
ic theory, empirical results and practical issues related to bail-in 
policies. For the first time, bail-in is discussed specifically in the 
Nordic context. The paper provides a very thorough picture of how 
bail-in is implemented in Europe and what the economic literature 
says on the possible benefits, costs and uncertainty related to 
these policies. I will focus on two issues. The first one is related to 
bail-in policies and the bail-in literature in general. The second one 
is more focused on the conclusions of the paper at hand.
1. Anything else but equity!
As a critique of the bail-in literature in general, it seems that the 
point of view from which bail-in policies are studied can be at least 
roughly described as anything but equity type of thinking. This 
quote is from the best-selling book The bankers’ new clothes by Ad-
mati and Hellwig (2013), where the authors claim that bail-inable 
debt is also a form of bankers’ new clothes or at least an instru-
ment created to avoid regulation implying significantly higher eq-
uity requirements for banks.  
Jokivuolle et al. provide a really good and comprehensive literature 
review of the research that tries to figure out the role and conse-
quences of bail-inable debt in bank capital regulation. The review 
gives more support for the view that the question academics and 
policy makers are currently focused on is ‘How much of banks’ total 
loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) should be bail-inable debt?’ rather 
than on ‘How much bail-inable debt should banks have, if any, given 
that equity is at a sufficient level?’. For example, only Mendicino et 
al. (2017) study simultaneously the level of TLAC and the shares of 
equity and bail-inable debt in it. In other words, can we really talk 
1 University of Turku. Email: kim.ristolainen@utu.fi.
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about the role of bail-inable debt in TLAC (relative to equity), if we 
are not taking into account the whole level of TLAC? Clearly the 
higher the level of TLAC is, the smaller is the need for bail-inable 
debt within TLAC, assuming that the purpose of bail-inable debt is 
to improve the resolution process. 
In a way, bail-inable debt is seen as a substitute for equity rath-
er than a complement. We are preparing for the worst (a banking 
crisis) without doing the necessary things (higher equity require-
ments) to prevent it in the first place. Instead, we are creating 
something more complex with uncertain effects (bail-inable debt 
substituting for equity in capital requirements). As the paper con-
cludes – especially in the context of a systemic event – there are 
many uncertainties regarding bail-in. There might be turmoil in the 
market due to trigger points where bail-inable debt is converted to 
equity. Although bail-in is included in the regulators’ toolbox, there 
might be a bailout anyway! On top of these issues, there will be 
operational challenges, spillovers etc. 
One must ask, why equity and bail-inable debt are not used sep-
arately so that the probability of a crisis is minimized with larger 
equity to total assets requirements and on top of this, bail-inable 
debt requirements to improve the resolution process if needed? 
There could be concerns that raising capital requirements would 
dampen economic activity via reduced bank lending. The argument 
for this view is usually that equity would be a more costly way for a 
bank to fund its business (lending etc.) than debt funding. 
Many studies (e.g.  Modigliani and Miller 1958, Cecchetti 2014, Aik-
man et al. 2018) give strong either theoretical or empirical argu-
ments for the opposite view, namely that higher capital require-
ments do not affect the cost of capital and, hence, should have no 
negative effects on bank lending and economic activity. Although it 
is still under debate whether higher capital requirements will affect 
the cost of bank lending and bank profitability, there seems to be 
at least some consensus on the benefits and costs of higher capital 
requirements for society. The former are large (lower probability of 
crisis and lower costs if it occurs) and the latter are small or close 
to none (bank lending not affected significantly). A recent survey 
by Ambrocio et al. (forthcoming) of the views of leading academic 




Due to the likely positive effects of higher equity requirements, un-
certainty related to the effects of bail-in policies and the fact that 
the Basel III requirement for the leverage ratio is currently 3%, it is 
quite hard to see why bail-inable debt is regarded as part of the 
solution for bank capital regulation. The question that needs to be 
answered in the first place is whether higher bank capital require-
ments have (socially) negative effects and how large these effects 
are relative to the positive ones. Only when these questions have 
been clarified and it has been concluded that the negative effects 
are larger than the positive effects, new forms of capital such as 
bail-inable debt should be considered in capital requirements. In 
the light of current regulation, where a fall of 3% in a bank’s asset 
value would result in insolvency, it can hardly be seen as socially op-
timal to introduce an uncertain policy instrument to substitute for 
a much more certain instrument.
2. Nordic bail-in uncertainty
The most significant contribution of Jokivuolle et al. is the discus-
sion of possible benefits and costs of bail-in in the Nordic context. 
The authors emphasize that the Nordic financial system is inter-
connected and consists of a small number of large banks, which 
implies that systemic events are more likely in the Nordics than in 
other financial systems. Although banks and financial authorities in 
the Nordics are well-advanced in their resolution planning, the ef-
fects of bail-in still remain uncertain. This relates to the fact there 
has been hardly any experience of bail-in in the context of systemic 
events in the Nordics or even in Europe after the imposition of the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in 2014. 
The authors discuss the bail-in of a systemic bank in Cyprus in 2013, 
where the bail-in had some effects on banks’ stock prices and CDS 
spreads outside Cyprus. However, Russian investors carried most 
of the bail-in losses, which together with the fact that Cyprus is 
neither a large economy nor has banks interconnected with EU 
banking systems may be a reason why the feared contagion effects 
were not substantial. 
Jokivuolle et al. also discuss two Danish bail-in cases where the 
banks were not systemic, but the stock markets and the ratings 
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of systemically important financial institutions nevertheless react-
ed clearly to the bail-in. The authors add that the spillover effects 
were small, probably due to the small size of both banks. In addi-
tion to these results, the only evidence of the effects of bailing-in 
interconnected banks is a simulation study that does not take into 
account several important things such as effects on small banks 
and other creditors, fire sales of assets etc. 
The points made in the previous part of this comment are even 
more relevant in the Nordic context as the uncertainties regarding 
bail-in are greater in the case of a highly interconnected financial 
system consisting of a few large banks. The benefits of higher equi-
ty requirements are somewhat agreed on: both smaller probability 
of and smaller cost associated with a crisis (the latter being more 
certain). The benefits of bail-in are more uncertain - equity is still 
equity and investors know this. Due to these uncertainties, the role 
of both bail-inable debt and equity capital as preservers of finan-
cial stability should be studied more. This paper has been a clear 
step in the correct direction.
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